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Abstract 
Several authors have explained that the like­
lihood ratio measures the strength of the evi­
dence represented by observations in statisti­
cal problems. This idea works fine when the 
goal is to evaluate the strength of the avail­
able evidence for a simple hypothesis versus 
another simple hypothesis. However, the ap­
plicability of this idea is limited to simple 
hypotheses because the likelihood function 
is primarily defined on points - simple hy­
potheses - of the parameter space. In this 
paper we define a general weight of evidence 
that is applicable to both simple and compos­
ite hypotheses. It is based on the Dempster­
Shafer concept of plausibility and is shown 
to be a generalization of the likelihood ratio. 
Functional models are of a fundamental im­
portance for the general weight of evidence 
proposed in this paper. The relevant con­
cepts and ideas are explained by means of a 
familiar urn problem and the general analysis 
of a real-world medical problem is presented. 
1 The Problem 
In a recent book, Richard Royall (11] explains that the 
likelihood ratio is the appropriate concept for measur­
ing the strength of the evidence represented by obser­
vations in statistical problems. He gives several very 
convincing arguments in favor of this idea and shows 
its relevance in the field of testing statistical hypothe­
ses. This interpretation of likelihood is based on Ian 
Hacking's law of likelihood (7] : 
If hypothesis A implies that the probability that a ran­
dom variable X takes the value x is P A ( x), while hy­
pothesis B implies that the probability is PB(x), then 
the observation X = x is evidence supporting A over B 
if and only if PA(x) > PB(x), and the likelihood ratio, 
P A ( x) / PB ( x), measures the strength of that evidence 
(I. Hacking, 1965). 
To elaborate on this idea we consider two spaces : the 
parameter space e and the observation space X. The 
set e is the set of possible values of the parameter 
variable t, whereas X is the set of possible values of 
the observable variable�· There is exactly one correct 
but unknown value of the parameter variable t. Fol­
lowing Dawid & Stone (1], a distributional model is 
the specification of conditional distributions Pe of the 
variable� given t = 0, i.e. 
P(� = xl t = 0) = Pe(x). (1) 
For each value X in X, the function lx : e -+ (0, 1] 
given by lx(O) = Pe(x) is the likelihood function of the 
observation x. According to the law of likelihood, the 
observation X = x is evidence supporting the hypoth­
esis t = 0 over the hypothesis t = 0' if 
(2) 
and the weight of that evidence is precisely 
Wx(O, O') := lx(O)/lx(O') .  (3) 
This defines a function 
Wx : 0 X 0-+ (0, ooj (4) 
which is called the weight of evidence function. Given 
a distributional model and an observation x, we can 
compute the weight of evidence of a simple hypothesis 
H = {0} over a simple hypothesis H' = {0'}. But 
the weight of evidence is not defined for composite 
hypotheses (a hypothesis is composite if it contains 
more than one element). As Royall [11] says, in general 
the law of likelihood is silent for composite hypotheses. 
In the next section we are going to define a general 
notion of weight of evidence that is applicable to any 
kind of hypotheses. Of course, this general weight of 
evidence will be compatible with the likelihood ratio, 
i.e. when the general weight of evidence is applied to 
simple hypotheses the result is the likelihood ratio. 
2 Likelihood and Plausibility 
In Monney [9] the classical notion of a functional model 
introduced by Bunke [4] and studied by Dawid & Stone 
[1] has been generalized to the so-called generalized 
functional models (abbreviated by G FM in this paper). 
It turns out that these models can be used to give a 
sound and reasonable definition of a general weight of 
evidence. Distributional models don't contain enough 
information to be able to compute weights of evidence 
for composite hypotheses. We need to leave the realm 
of distributional models and enter the more informa­
tive class of generalized functional models to reach that 
goal. 
A generalized functional model is a pair (!, P) where 
f is a function and p is a probability distribution. If n 
denotes the set of possible values of a random variable 
E, then the function f is a mapping f : e X n -+ X 
with f ( e, w) representing the value of the variable � 
that must necessarily be observed if e is the correct 
value of the parameter variable t and the realization 
of the random variable E is w. The distribution of E 
is the known probability measure p on n and in a 
GFM the function j is assumed to be known. By the 
way, note that a GFM can be seen as a parameterized 
particular causal theory in the sense of Pearl [10]. 
The observation of a value x for the variable � in a 
GFM generates some information about the unknown 
correct value of the parameter variable t. It turns out 
that this is a Dempster-Shafer belief function which 
will be denoted by 1-lx (Shafer [12], Kohlas & Monney 
[8]). More precisely, if 
vx(D) = {wED: :3 e E 0 such that j(e,w) = x}, 
(5) 
then for every w E Vx (D) there is a corresponding focal 
set of 1-lx given by 
fx(w) = {e E 0: j(e,w) = x}. (6) 
The basic probability assignment (or m-function) mx 
of the belief function 1-lx is 
mx(F) = L {P(w)/P(vx(D)): rx(w) = F} (7) 
for all subsets F � e. The logic behind the derivation 
of these equations is given in Monney [9]. 
From a GFM we can logically derive a unique distri­
butional model as follows. For every e E 0, let Pe be 
the probability distribution on X given by 
Pe ( x) = P ( { w E n : J ( e, w) = x}) . ( s) 
The plausibility function Plx associated with the belief 
function 1-lx has a very interesting property. Indeed, if 
lx denotes the likelihood function of the distributional 
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model associated with the GFM when x is observed, 
then it can easily be verified that 
Plx(e) = c ·lx(e) (9) 
for all e E 0, where c is a positive constant that 
does not depend on e. This means that the plausi­
bility function restricted to simple hypotheses is pro­
portional to the likelihood function of the associated 
distributional model. From this result, given an ob­
servation x, it is quite natural to define the weight of 
evidence of a general hypothesis H � e over a general 
hypothesis H' � e by 
Wx(H,H') := Plx(H)/Plx(H') . (10) 
Then the weight of evidence of the simple hypothesis 
H = {e} over the simple hypothesis H' = {e'} is 
Plx(e)jPlx(e') c c · lx c e) ) 1 c c · lx c e')) 
lx(e)/lx(e'), 
which shows that the definition (10) extends to com­
posite hypotheses the weight of evidence for simple 
hypotheses given in (3). 
Of course, the concepts defined above for a single ob­
servation can easily be extended to the situation of 
several independent observations. First consider the 
case of distributional models. For all e E 8, let Pe be 
a distribution on X. In a total of r independent obser­
vations of the variable �, suppose that the value x is 
observed m times and the value x' is observed n times 
(m + n = r) . These observations are considered as in­
dependent realisations of the variable �- Given these 
observations, the likelihood of the parameter value e 
is m n 
lm,n(e) := II lx(e) ·II lx'(e). (11) 
i=l i=l 
Then the law of likelihood implies that the weight of 
evidence of e over e' is 
wm,n(e,e') lm,n (e) /lm,n( e') 
m n 
II wx(e,e') ·II wx'(e,e'). (12) 
i=l i=l 
However, within the given distributional model, the 
weight of evidence for composite hypotheses is not de­
fined. 
Now consider the same observations from the point of 
view of a GFM having the given distributions Pe as 
its associated distributional model. Since the observa­
tions are independent, it is reasonable to use Demp­
ster's rule of combination to combine the belief func­
tions coming from all the observations taken individ­
ually. The resulting belief function on e, which is de­
noted by 1-lm,n, represents the information generated 
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on e based on all the observations made : 
If Plm,n denotes the plausibility function of 1im,n, 
then it  is  natural to  define the weight of evidence of a 
hypothesis H � 8 over a hypothesis H' � 8 by 
Wm,n(H,H') := Plm,n(H)/Plm,n(H'). (14) 
By theorem 4.9 of Kohlas & Monney [8], for all() E 8 
we have 
m n 
Plm,n(B) = C ·(II lx(B) ·II lx'(B)) (15) i=l i=l 
where c is a positive constant which does not depend 
on (). This implies that the general definition of weight 
of evidence given in equation (14) generalizes to any 
type of hypothesis the weight of evidence for simple 
hypothesis given in equation (12) : 
Plm,n(()) = ft Wx ((), ()') . :ft Wx' ((), ()'). (16) Plm,n(B') i=l i=l 
If the belief function 1im,n happens to be precise, i.e. 
all its focal sets are one-element subsets of e, then it 
can be proved that 
(H H') - LoeEH lm,n(B) (17) Wm,n ' - LoOEH' lm,n(B) 
Another special case occurs when the belief function 
1im,n is consonant, i.e. all its focal sets are nested. In 
this case we have 
1 max {lm,n(B) : () E H} ( ) Wm,n(H, H )  = max {lm,n(B) : () E H'}
. 18 
The last two equations are consequences of results 
on precise and consonant belief functions that can be 
found in Kohlas & Monney [8]. The situation where 
more than two different values x and x' are observed 
can be treated in a similar way. 
3 Functional and Distributional 
Models 
We have seen that we need a generalized functional 
model to compute the weight of evidence for composite 
hypotheses. The problem is that in general there ex­
ist several GFM having the same associated distribu­
tional model. This means that if the initial knowledge 
is given in the form of a distributional model, then the 
weight of evidence will depend on the GFM that is cho­
sen to represent the given distributional model. To il­
lustrate this fact, we are going to consider a particular 
distributional model and analyze two different GFM 
representing it. However, it should be mentionned that 
there is no reason why the initial knowledge should 
necessarily be given in the form of a distributional 
model. Any functional model that faithfully reflects 
the mechanism of the generation of the observed data 
can serve as an initial model. 
Suppose that an urn contains four balls which are ei­
ther black or white. We successively and randomly 
draw a ball from the urn and observe its color before 
it is placed back into the urn. Let ( denote the vari­
able indicating the color of the ball drawn. Suppose 
that we draw a total of r balls and that m happen 
to be white whereas n = r - m happen to be black. 
Based on these observations, what can be inferred on 
the correct value of the parameter variable t indicating 
the number of white balls in the urn ? In particular, 
what is the weight of the evidence represented by the 
observations with respect to certain hypotheses ? Let 
e = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} denote the set of possible values of 
the variable t (the unknown number of white balls in 
the urn) and let X= {0, 1} denote the set of possible 
values of the observable variable ( where 1 represents 
white and 0 represents black. The distributional model 
for this problem is, for all () E 8, 
{ B/4 ifx=1 Pe(x)= 1- B/4 ifx=O. (19) 
The classical binomial and Bayesian models (which re­
quires an additional prior distribution on e) can be 
used to make statistical inferences on e. But if we 
want to compute weights of evidence for any kind of 
hypotheses we need functional models. In the follow­
ing two subsections we are going to present two GFMs 
having Pe as their associated distributional model. 
3.1 A First GFM for the Urn Problem 
The generalized functional model that will be pre­
sented in this subsection is inspired from the idea of 
conditional embedding proposed by Smets [14]. The 
method of conditional embedding is also described in 
Shafer [13]. Since we already have defined the variables 
t and (, we still have to specify the variable f. and its 
distribution along with the function f expressing what 
must necessarily be observed for each possible value of 
t and E. We take the variable f. to be indicating a 
particular relation between e and X. More precisely, 
the set of possible values of f. is n = {<pi, <p2, .. . , <ps} 
where each <pi is the indicator function of a certain 
subset Si of 8. In other words, <pi(()) = 1 if() E Si and 
0 otherwise. The eight sets 81, ... , Ss are 
51= {4}, 5z = {1,4}, 53= {2,4}, 54= {3,4}, 
55= {1,2,4}, 56= {1,3,4}, 57= {2,3,4}, 
5s = {1,2,3,4}. 
The distribution of E is defined to be 
P(cpi) = 3/32, P(cp2) = 1/32, P(cp3) = 3/32, 
P(cp4) = 9/32, P(cp5) = 1/32, P(cp5) = 3/32, 
P(cp1) = 9/32, P(cps) = 3/32. 
The last piece of the GFM still missing is the function 
f : 6 x fl -t X. This function is defined by 
f(B, 'Pi)= 'Pi(B). (20) 
It can easily be proved that the distributional model 
associated with this GFM is Pe given in (19). 
If we observe a white ball (� = 1) in one draw, then 
the corresponding belief function 1{1 on e has eight 
focal sets which are 
{BEe: j(B,cpi) = 1} 
{ (} E 6 : 'Pi (B) = 1} 
5i (21) 
for all i = 1, ... , 8. Of course, the m-value of 5i is 
P(cpi) · We can show that if we observe only white 
balls in the r draws (i.e. m = r and n = 0), then 
the focal sets of the resulting belief function 1im,o are 
again 51, . . . , 5s and 
Plm,o( {1, 2}) 
Plm,o ( {2, 3}) 
Plm,o({1,3}) 
(1/4)m + (1/2)m- (1/8)m 
(3/4)m + (1/2)m- (3/8)m 
(3/4)m + (1/4)m- (3/16r. 
This can be used to compute the weights of evidence. 
The case where only black balls are observed can be 
treated in a similar way. 
Now consider the situation where we draw r 2: 2 balls 
and m 2: 1 happen to be white and n 2: 1 happen 
to be black (r = m + n) . If 1io,n denotes the belief 
function resulting from the observation of the n black 
balls, then 
1im,n = 1im,O EB 1io,n (22) 
is the belief function corresponding to the observation 
of the black and white balls. Its plausibility function 
satisfies 
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for some positive constant K. Once again, this can be 
used to compute the weights of evidence as a function 
of m and n. 
3.2 A Second GFM for the Urn Problem 
As in the previous model, let t denote the parameter 
variable indicating the number of white balls in the 
urn and � the observable variable indicating the color 
of the ball that is drawn (1 for white and 0 for black). 
In this model we assume that the four balls in the urn 
are numbered from 1 to 4. In addition, if there is (} 
white balls in the urn, we make the assumption that 
the white balls are numbered from 1 to (} and the black 
balls are numbered from (} + 1 to 4. This is an impor­
tant assumption that will permit us to easily specify a 
functional model. It is similar to the condition charac­
terizing the so-called structures of the first kind intro­
duced by Dempster [5, 6]. Since randomly drawing a 
ball in the urn is equivalent to randomly selecting the 
number of a ball, let E denote the variable represent­
ing the selected number and let n = { 1' 0 0 0 ' 4} denote 
the set of its possible values. Of course the distribu­
tion of E is P(w) = 1/4 for all w E n. To complete 
the specification of the GFM we define the function 
J: ex n -t x by 
j(B,w) = { 1 if w :S � (23) 0 otherwise 
because we necessarily observe a white ball if the ran­
domly selected number w is less than or equal to (}. 
Let's prove that the distributional model associated 
with this GFM is Pe given in (19). If x = 1, then we 
have 
P({w ED: j(B,w) = 1}) = P({w: w :S B}) = B/4. 
Similarly, if x = 0, then we have 
P({w ED: f(B,w) = 0}) = P({w: w > B}) = 1- Bj4. 
If we observe a white ball in one draw, then the cor­
responding belief function 1{1 on e has four focal sets 
which are 
{BE 6: f(B,w) = 1} 
{ (} E 6 : w :S B} 
{w,w + 1, .. . ,4} (24) 
for all w E D = {1, 2, 3, 4}. The m-value of each of 
these focal sets is 1/4. Note that 1i1 is a consonant 
belief function because its focal sets are nested. 
We can show that if we observe only white balls in the 
r draws, then the focal sets of the resulting belief func­
tion 1im,O are again rl(w) for all WE fl = {1,2,3,4}, 
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which shows that 1-lm,o is also a consonant belief func­
tion. Moreover, the m-value of the focal sets of 1-lm,o 
is given by 
mm,o({1,2,3,4}) = 
mm,o( {2, 3, 4}) 
mm,o({3,4}) 
mm,o({4}) 
(1/4)m 
(1/2)m- (1/4)m 
(3/4)m-(1/2)m 
1-(3/4)m. (25) 
Since 1-lm,o is consonant, then by theorem 3. 7 of Kohlas 
& Monney [8] we have 
Plm,o(H) =max {Plm,o(B) : {} E H} (26) 
for all H � e and 
Plm,o(B) = h(B)m = (B/4)m (27) 
for all {} E 8 because it can be shown that c = 1 in 
equation (15). In particular we obtain 
Plm,o( {1, 2}) = 
Plm,o( {2, 3}) 
Plm,o({1,3}) 
(1/2)m 
(3/4)m 
(3/4)m, (28) 
which in turn can be used to compute the weights of 
evidence. 
The case where only black balls are observed can be 
treated in a similar way. 
Now consider the situation where we draw r 2:: 2 balls 
and m 2:: 1 happen to be white and n 2:: 1 happen 
to be black (r = m + n) . If 1-lo,n denotes the belief function resulting from the observation of the n black 
balls, then 
1-lm,n = 1-lm,O EB 1-lo,n (29) 
is the belief function corresponding to the observation 
of the black and white balls. Its plausibility function 
satisfies 
where 
Plm,n( {1, 2}) 
Plm,n( {2, 3}) 
Plm,n( {1, 3}) 
N12/K 
N23/K 
N13/K, 
N1 2  (1/4)m(3/4)n + (1/2)n((1/2)m- (1/4)m) 
N23 (1/4)n(3/4)m + (1/2)m((l/2)n-(1/4)n) 
N1 3 (1/4)m(3/4)n + (1/4)n((3/4)m-(1/4)m) 
and K is a constant. This in turn can be used to com­
pute the weights of evidence. Note that the plausibility 
degrees obtained in this model are different from those 
obtained in the model considered in the previous sub­
section, which implies that the weights of evidence are 
also different. 
4 Evidence About a Survival Rate 
In this section we are going to generalize the last model 
to the situation where there is an arbitrary number 
of balls in the urn. However, in order to illustrate 
the applicability of the theory developed in this paper, 
we analyze a real-world example that gives a concrete 
significance to this urn problem. It is based on a real 
clinical problem from the early 1980s. The problem 
was to generate information about the survival rate of 
newborn babies with a certain critical health problem 
using a new treatment called extracorporeal membrane 
oxygenation (Bartlett et al. [2], Ware [15], Begg [3], see 
also Royall [11]). It had been shown that the survival 
rate with the old treatment is about 20% and scientists 
where quite confident that the new treatment might 
have a survival rate of at least 80%. Based on the 
observation of the effect of the new treatment on a 
few babies, the problem is to gauge the impact of this 
evidence for a survival rate of more than 80% versus a 
survival rate of 20%. 
This problem is modelled in the following way. Con­
sider the population S of all babies suffering from this 
specific health problem and let L denote the subset 
consisting of those babies who would live with the new 
treatment. Assuming that there are N babies in the 
entire population S and {} babies in the subpopulation 
L, the survival rate is defined to be {} / N. Of course 
the number of surviving babies {} is unkown. Let t de­
note the variable indicating the number of babies who 
would survive with the new treatment. The set of pos­
sible values oft is e = {1, 2, . . .  , N}. Let� denote the 
variable indicating the result of the new treatment on 
a baby in S. We define that � is 1 when the baby 
lives and 0 otherwise, so that the set of possible val­
ues of� is X= {0, 1}. Also, it is assumed that every 
baby in the population S has the same chance of being 
observed. 
Using this information, the following distributional 
model between e and X can be defined : for all () E e, 
Pe(1) = B/N, Pe(O) = 1- (B/N). (30) 
Given some observations, Royall [11] determines the 
weight of evidence for the hypothesis H2 = {0.8 · N} 
over the hypothesis H{ = {0.2·N}. Since both of these 
hypotheses are simple, the distributional model is suf­
ficient to compute this value. However, here we want 
to determine the weight of evidence for the hypothesis 
H2 = {B : {} 2:: 0.8 · N} over the hypothesis H1 = H{. 
As we have seen, for this purpose we need a GFM hav­
ing Pe as its associated distributional model. First it 
is assumed that the babies in S are numbered from 1 
to N in such a way that the babies in L are numbered 
first. In other words, the babies in L are numbered 
from 1 to () and the babies in S - L are numbered 
from () + 1 to N. Let E denote the variable represent­
ing the number of a baby randomly selected from S 
and let D = {1, ... , N} denote the set of its possible 
values. Of course P(w) = 1/N for all w E D. Then we 
are in a position to define the function f : e X n -+ X 
of the GFM by 
j((), w)= { 1 ifw:s;e 0 otherwise. (31) 
This functions gives the result of the new treatment on 
the baby number w when there are () babies in the pop­
ulation L. The distributional model associated with 
this GFM is clearly Pe given in (30). 
Suppose that we observe a baby who lives whith the 
new treatment. From this evidence, what is the belief 
function 1-{1 on e that can be inferred ? It turns out 
that this is a consonant belief function whose focal sets 
are 
{() E 9: j((), w) = 1} 
{ e E e : w :::::; e} 
{w, w + 1, . . .  ,N} (32) 
for all w E D. If [r .. s] represents the set of all inte­
gers between r and s (the limits are included), this 
shows that the focal sets of 1-l1 are Fi = [i .. N] for 
all i = 1, ... , N and the m-value of Fi is 1/ N for all 
i = 1, ... ,N. 
Now suppose that the new treatment is given to m 
babies and that they all live. If 1-lm,o denotes the 
belief function on e induced by these observations, 
then it can be shown that its focal sets are again 
Fi, i = 1, ... ,N, which shows that 1-lm,o is also a con­
sonant belief function. But what is the m-function of 
this belief function ? For i = 1, ... , N, let m�m) de­
note the m-value of the focal set Fi of 1-lm,O· Then 
Dempster's rule of combination implies that 
i-1 
m�m) = (1/N)(i . m�m-1) + L mjm-1)) (33) 
!=1 
for all i = 1, ... , N. Defining the N x N matrix 
0 0 
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Note that the matrix T has the remarkable property of 
being stochastic, i.e. each of its columns sums to 1 and 
all its entries are non-negative. Considering the focal 
sets F1, ... , FN as theN states of a Markov chain, this 
implies that T is the transition matrix of a Markov 
chain Zt, t = 1, 2, ... with 
P(Zt = F;) = m�t). (35) 
Of course, the initial distribution of the chain is 
P(Z1 = F;) = m� l) = 1/N (36) 
for all i = 1, ... , N. As a consequence of equation (34) 
we have 
(37) 
Therefore, to compute the m-function of 1-lm,o we have 
to compute the ( m -1 )-th power of the matrix T. For­
tunately, the matrix T has N different eigenvalues that 
are all real and by the Jordan decomposition method 
we obtain 
where 
-1 
1 
0 
M =  
0 
0 
and 
1/N 
0 
0 
L =  
0 
0 
This implies that 
T= MLM-1 
0 
-1 0 
1 -1 0 
0 1 
0 
2/N 0 
0 3/N 0 
0 
-1 0 
0 1 
i/N 0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 1 
(38) 
(39) 
1/N 
1/N 2/N 
1/N 1/N 
0 
3/N 0 
0 and since Lm-1 is a diagonal matrix whose (i, i)-th 
element is (i/N)m-1, a little algebra shows that 
T= 
1/N 1/N 
1/N 1/N 1/N 
1/N i/N 0 
0 
NjN 
and the vector m(m) = (mlm) , ... , m}:;l)' (the prime 
means transpose), these equations can be written as 
m(m) = T . m(m-1). (34) 
(m) im - (i- 1)m m. = --::-- -'--� Nm 
for all i = 1, ... , N. 
(40) 
When we observe that more and more babies survive 
with the new treatment and no one dies, i.e. when m 
tends to infinity, the m-function of 1-lm,o tends to the 
m-function m* given by m*( {N}) = 1 and m*(F;) = 0 
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for the other focal sets Fi. But m * represents the be­
lief function asserting that N is surely the exact value 
of the parameter, which means that every baby will 
survive with the new treatment. Of course, this result 
is compatible with our intuition because if we observe 
more and more babies who survive with new treat­
ment (and never observe a baby who dies) , then we are 
more and more inclined to believe that the new treat­
ment will cure all babies. This asymptotic behavior of 
the belief function 1im,o is also a consequence of the 
fact that the state { N} is the only closed class of the 
Markov chain, i.e. it is an absorbing state of the chain. 
Since 1im,o is a consonant belief function and 
Plm,o(O) = (0/N)m (41) 
for all 0 E 0, it is easy to compute the degree of plau­
sibility of any hypothesis H � 0 because 
Plm,o(H) =max {Plm,o(O) : 0 E H}. (42) 
This in turn allows us to compute the weight of ev­
idence for any pair of hypotheses. For example, for 
the specific hypotheses H1 and H2 defined above we 
obtain 
(43) 
Now consider the situation where we observe a baby 
who does not survive with the new treatment. From 
this observation, what is the belief function 1io on 
0 that can be inferred ? It turns out that this 
is a consonant belief function whose focal sets are 
Gi = [O .. (N- i)] for all i = 1, . . .  , N and them-value 
of G i is 1 / N for all i = 1, . .. , N. 
Now suppose that the new treatment is given to n ba­
bies and that none of them survive. If 1io,n denote the 
belief function on e induced by these observations, 
then the focal sets of 1io,n are again Gi, i = 1, . . .  , N, 
which shows that 1io,n is again a consonant belief func­
tion. But what is the m-function of this belief func­
tion ? If m�n) denotes the m-value of the focal set 
Gi of 1io,n, the Jordan decomposition method can be 
used to prove that 
(44) 
for all i = 1, . . .  , N because it is again possible to iden­
tify an underlying Markov chain. As above, this result 
can be used to compute 1io,n when n tends to infinity. 
Since 1io,n is a consonant belief function and 
Plo,n(O) = (1- (0/N))n (45) 
for all 0 E 0, it is easy to compute the degree of plau­
sibility of any hypothesis H � 0 because 
Plo,n(H) =max {Plo,n(O) : 0 E H}. (46) 
This in turn can be used to compute the weight of 
evidence for any pair of hypotheses. For example, we 
obtain 
( ) 0.2
n n-1 Wo,n H2, H1 = O.B = 0.25 · 0.2 . (47) 
Finally, let's suppose that among r 2: 2 babies to which 
the new treatment is administered, a total of m 2: 1 
live and a total of n 2: 1 die (m + n = r). Let 
1im,n = 1im,O EB 1io,n (48) 
denote the belief function on e induced by these ob­
servations. In this case, it turns out that for all (i,j) 
in 
� = {(i,j) E 0 x 0: i + j :S N} (49) 
the set Eii = [i .. (N- j)] is a focal set of 1im,n and its 
m-value is 
where 
N 
K 2.)zn- (l- l)n)(N -l)m 
1=1 
N 
2:)zm- (l -l)m)(N -l)n. 
1=1 
(50) 
Note that the belief function 1im,n is no longer conso­
nant. If Plm,n denotes its plausibility function, then 
we can easily find that 
Pl (0) = o
m(N-O)n 
m,n K (51) 
for all 0 E 0. In addition, the degree of plausibility of 
[O .. r] and [l..r] are the same, and the degree of plausi­
bility of [r .. N] and [r .. (N- 1)] are the same. F inally, 
it can also be verified that 
Plm,n([l..r]) = 
Plm,n([r .. N]) = 
L�=l (zm-(l- l)m)(N -l)n 
K 
L:f-.-�r(zn- (l-l)n)(N -l)m 
K 
for all r in {0, . . .  , N} and 
Plm,n([r .. s]) = Plm,n([l..s]) + Plm,n([r .. N])- 1 (52) 
for all r and s such that 0 ::; r ::; s :S N. These results 
can be used to compute the weight of evidence for any 
pair of hypotheses. For example, we obtain 
If we collect the actual observations resulting from two 
studies about the effectiveness of the new treatment, 
we find that among r = 40 babies who received the 
new treatment a total of m = 39 babies survived and 
only n = 1 baby died. In this case we get 
A finer analysis of this function of N reveals that it 
stays approximately constant for N � 250 : 
(54) 
for N � 250. This means that the weight of the 
available evidence for H2 versus H1 is approximately 
w = 5 · 1025. In order to give an intuitive interpreta­
tion to this value, consider an urn containing two balls 
which can be either black or white. If WW denotes the 
hypothesis that they are both white and BW denotes 
the hypothesis that there is one black and one white, 
then the weight of evidence w = 5 · 1025 is approxi­
mately the same as the weight of evidence for WW 
versus BW when we observe 85 white balls in 85 ran­
dom draws of a ball from the urn. This is pretty strong 
evidence for the hypothesis that the new treatment's 
survival rate is at least 80% versus the hypothesis that 
it is 20% (the old treatment's survival rate) . 
5 Conclusion 
We have defined a general concept of weight of evi­
dence that is applicable to any kind of parametric hy­
pothesis. Classical distributional models do not con­
vey enough information to generate a natural and gen­
eral concept of weight of evidence. In other words, 
they are too coarse of a representation of the mechan­
ical process underlying the generation of the data ob­
served. Generalized functional models and the theory 
of belief functions are the appropriate tools for defining 
such a general concept. Finally, a weight of evidence 
can be given a concrete significance by finding a well 
understood and simple situation leading to the same 
weight of evidence. 
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